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# The Struggles and Well-being of Maoist Ex-combatants in Post-conflict Nepal

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## Abstract

*Nepal has experienced significant political and social changes over the past three decades, including the restoration of democracy in 1990, a decade-long Maoist insurgency (1996-2006), and the transition to a federal democratic republic in 2008. Despite these changes and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006, the inclusion and well-being of former Maoist combatants in state structures remain persistent challenges. This paper explores how former combatants in the Maoist-affected Rukum district struggle to sustain their daily lives and how their perceptions of past involvement have evolved over time. Drawing on in-depth interviews, the study reveals that a majority of participants face precarious livelihoods, have limited access to education or skill development, and are often compelled into informal or low-paying labour, including migration abroad. As transitional justice remains unfinished, their aspirations for socio-political recognition and economic security following the peaceful transition are gradually diminishing. Their subjective experiences and material conditions reveal a profound disconnect between the promises of the peace process and the realities of reintegration. The state's investments and activism aimed at improving the well-being of ex-combatants have not yielded results. This study contributes to broader discussions on post-conflict recovery, structural inequality, and Nepal's ongoing political transition.*

## Keywords

Insurgency, Peace-accord, Ex-combatants, Reintegration, Well-being.

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## 1. Introduction

The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPNM) has been at the center of political discourse in Nepal ever since its involvement in the 'People's War' (PW), which began in 1996. This conflict was initiated with the aim of replacing the constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system with what the party termed a 'New Democracy' . At the start, the PW unfolded through a series of coordinated attacks on police posts in districts such as Rolpa, Rukum, Sindhuli, Gorkha, Kalikot, and other rural areas across the country (Sapkota, 2010: 251). As the conflict intensified, the Maoists escalated their operations to engage directly with the Royal Nepal Army, launching attacks on its barracks in various parts of the nation. The prolonged and direct confrontation between the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) led to the deaths of 17,265 people, with at least 1,302 individuals reported missing during the course of the war. In addition to fatalities, countless others suffered injuries or were forced to leave their homes, creating large-scale displacement and disruption in affected communities.

From April 2000 onward, the Maoists revised their military strategy and overall approach by initiating dialogue with the government, signaling a shift toward seeking a peaceful resolution to the PW. The party declared that the war had progressed to the 'strategic offensive' stage, having moved beyond the earlier phases of 'strategic defense' and 'strategic balance' (Thapa & Sijapati, 2004: 99). During this period, the Maoists adopted a flexible approach to warfare, alternating between defensive and offensive postures depending on the relative strength of state forces (Upreti, 2008: 67). They typically assumed an offensive role when the government's forces were weak or vulnerable. Political engagement also intensified, with formal dialogue between the Maoists and the government beginning in 2001. In 2003, a resolution passed during the CPNM central committee meeting reflected a significant ideological shift, as the party acknowledged, for the first time since the launch of the PW, the possibility of entering the competitive political process.

A major turning point in the party's strategy occurred during the central committee meeting held at Chunwang in September-October 2005. At this meeting, the CPNM officially decided to work toward establishing Nepal as a democratic republic, moving away from its earlier goal of creating a New Democratic regime solely through armed struggle. Following this ideological and strategic transformation, the party joined forces with seven other political parties to initiate the Second People's Movement in 2006, which successfully reinstated the parliament that had been dissolved. Subsequently, on 22 November 2006, the CPNM signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord with the alliance of parties, formally bringing an end to the People's War.

Following the peace agreement, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) played a key role in managing Maoist combatants. A total of 19,602 former combatants, including 3,846 women, were verified and placed in seven division cantonments across the country. By 2012, 1,441 of these ex-combatants had been integrated into the Nepal Army, while the remaining 15,585 opted for voluntary retirement, receiving financial support ranging from NPR 500,000 (US$ 5,000) to NPR 800,000 (US$ 8,000) depending on their rank and roles within the Maoist army. These former fighters returned to their communities and attempted to reintegrate into daily life, though the process proved challenging and complex.

## 2. Objectives of the Study

This study aims to examine the post-conflict experiences and well-being of Maoist ex-combatants in Nepal following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. In particular, the article explores the everyday struggles faced by former members of the Maoist People's Liberation Army as they attempt to reintegrate into civilian life after the end of the armed conflict. It seeks to analyze the socio-economic, psychological, and community-level challenges encountered by ex-combatants, including issues related to livelihood opportunities, social acceptance, and adaptation to post-conflict realities. By focusing on their day-to-day experiences and well-being, the study aims to understand the broader implications of reintegration for sustainable peace and social stability in post-conflict Nepal.

## 3. Methodology

This article is based on a qualitative approach, using an explanatory research design to understand the experiences and well-being of former Maoist combatants. The study involved fieldwork in Rukum district, where I carefully selected 20 ex-combatants to

participate. The participants were chosen using purposive and snowball sampling, which helped identify individuals who could share detailed and meaningful insights about their lives after the conflict. I conducted in-depth interviews with these ex-combatants, allowing them to share their stories, challenges, and reflections in their own words. These conversations provided a rich understanding of their personal experiences, social realities, and the barriers they face in rebuilding their lives. In addition to the field interviews, I also consulted secondary sources, including newspaper interviews and published accounts of ex-combatants, to add context and support the findings. The research began with a review of existing literature on well-being, which offered a conceptual framework to guide the study. This framework was then connected with the field and secondary data, allowing me to analyze the well-being of the ex-combatants in terms of both their material conditions and their freedom, dignity, and opportunities to lead meaningful lives.

## 4. Sociology of Well-being

Well-being refers to the overall quality of life, encompassing both subjective well-being, which relates to an individual's feelings and personal evaluation of their life, and objective well-being, which considers external factors such as health, income, and safety (Ed Diener, 1984; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2013). Individual well-being focuses on the quality of life of a single person, whereas community well-being assesses how effectively a group of people functions and prospers (Corey L. M. Keyes, 1998). Well-being can be categorized according to different life domains, including physical, psychological, emotional, social, and economic aspects (Carol D. Ryff, 1989). Some definitions emphasize a single aspect, such as happiness (Ed Diener, 1984), while others adopt a broader perspective, incorporating elements like good physical and mental health, positive emotions, an engaged and meaningful lifestyle, inner balance, and healthy interpersonal relationships (Martin E. P. Seligman, 2011). Certain frameworks also consider material conditions, such as income, security, and environmental quality (OECD, 2013).

Amartya Sen presents a broader and more nuanced understanding of well-being, distinct from traditional approaches that emphasize happiness, income, or material wealth. He introduces the capabilities framework, highlighting an individual's ability to access real opportunities and lead the kind of life they value (Sen, 1999, 2009). In this framework, functionings refer to the various "beings and

doings" of a person, such as being healthy, educated, or actively participating in community life, while capabilities represent the genuine freedoms and opportunities to achieve these functionings. For Sen, well-being is not determined solely by possessions but by what individuals can effectively accomplish and freely choose to do. Central to his perspective is freedom, as a person's well-being depends on their capacity to make meaningful choices and pursue goals, they consider important. Sen critiques approaches that equate well-being with income or utility, arguing that a comprehensive assessment must include a wide range of human capabilities, such as health, education, social engagement, and empowerment. Although his framework primarily focuses on individual capabilities, it also has implications for community and societal well-being, since social and institutional contexts shape what people can realistically achieve.

## 5. From the Battlefield to Civilian Life

After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006, a significant transition began in Nepal's political and military landscape. One of the immediate tasks following the agreement was the management of the Maoist fighters who had participated in the decade-long insurgency known as the Nepalese Civil War. To oversee this sensitive process, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was assigned the responsibility of monitoring and managing thousands of Maoist combatants who were temporarily housed in seven cantonments located in different parts of the country. These cantonments functioned as controlled spaces where former fighters waited for a final decision regarding their future-whether they would be integrated into the national security forces, rehabilitated into civilian life, or pursue alternative paths.

Over the following years, a structured process of verification, demobilization, and reintegration gradually unfolded. By 2012, the peace process had produced a concrete outcome: 1,441 former Maoist combatants were officially integrated into the Nepal Army, thereby becoming part of the state's formal military institution. At the same time, a much larger number-15,585 former fighters-opted for voluntary retirement. As part of the negotiated settlement, these individuals received financial packages ranging from NPR 500,000 to 800,000, the amount varying according to their rank and role within the Maoist command structure. While these payments provided some immediate financial support, they did not necessarily ensure a smooth transition into civilian life. For many former combatants, the journey from armed struggle back to ordinary society proved far more complex than

expected. Returning home meant not only leaving behind the routines of cantonment life but also adjusting psychologically, socially, and economically to an unfamiliar civilian environment.

In order to better understand how these former fighters navigated the difficult transition, I carried out a series of interviews with 20 ex-combatants from the Rukum District in western Nepal. This district had been one of the epicenters of the Maoist insurgency and was deeply affected by the conflict. In addition to these interviews, I examined numerous personal stories and reflections that had appeared in national newspapers over the years. Listening to these individuals speak about their experiences was both revealing and emotionally powerful. Many of them shared their memories with a mixture of honesty, frustration, and quiet disappointment. One former combatant, now in his mid-thirties, described how difficult it was to adjust to the slow and repetitive rhythms of everyday life. "When we were young", he explained, "we believed we were part of a movement that would change the entire system. Now, life feels limited to worrying about daily expenses, children's education, and basic survival."

For many of these individuals, ordinary civilian life initially felt dull and purposeless compared to the intensity and sense of mission they had experienced during the insurgency. Several recalled that during their youth they had deliberately rejected the conventional path of education, employment, and family life because they believed in the revolutionary promise of social transformation. They had joined the Maoist movement hoping to challenge the existing social order, escape poverty and unemployment, and contribute to building a more just and inclusive Nepal. However, many of them now feel that those aspirations remain largely unfulfilled. Instead of witnessing dramatic social change, their daily lives revolve around modest economic struggles and family responsibilities.

Another major challenge that repeatedly surfaced in these conversations was the lingering social stigma attached to their past involvement in the Maoist movement. Even though the conflict had formally ended years earlier, many ex-combatants still felt that they were viewed with suspicion or distrust by members of society. As a result, some chose not to openly reveal their past affiliation with the Maoist party. One interviewee told me that when he applied for a job, he avoided mentioning his years as a combatant because he feared it might close opportunities rather than create them. Although many former fighters genuinely wished to contribute positively to society, they often felt that their efforts were hindered by insufficient support

from the government, political parties, community institutions, and international donor agencies.

Interestingly, most of the ex-combatants I spoke with did not return permanently to their original villages. Instead, many settled in areas close to former cantonments or moved to urban and semi-urban centers where infrastructure and economic opportunities were relatively better. Access to roads, electricity, schools, health facilities, and markets influenced their decisions. These locations offered not only better material conditions but also a certain degree of anonymity. Living in larger towns sometimes allowed them to avoid the social scrutiny that they might face in their native communities.

Reintegration proved particularly difficult for individuals whose wartime roles had involved direct acts of violence. Some acknowledged that during the insurgency they had participated in killings, abductions, or other coercive activities carried out as part of the Maoist strategy. At the time, they believed these actions were necessary steps toward achieving a revolutionary vision of a more developed and inclusive Nepal. Yet the consequences of those actions continued to shape their lives long after the conflict had ended. In some communities, families who had lost relatives during the war still harbored deep resentment. A few ex-combatants shared stories about how they avoided returning to certain villages because the families of victims continued to demand accountability or expressed anger toward those who had encouraged their children to join the insurgency. These unresolved grievances created emotional burdens that made the process of social reconciliation extremely difficult.

The financial packages given to retired combatants were intended to facilitate their transition into civilian life, but in practice the money came without adequate guidance or long-term support. There were few programs to teach financial management, vocational skills, or entrepreneurship. As a result, the outcomes varied widely. Some individuals used their funds responsibly, for example, by purchasing land, starting small businesses, or supporting their families. Others invested in motorcycles, mobile phones, or household improvements. However, there were also cases where the sudden availability of cash led to unproductive spending on alcohol or other indulgences. Without professional training or sustainable employment opportunities, many ex-combatants eventually found themselves facing financial difficulties once again.

A considerable number of former fighters attempted to seek employment abroad. According to reports published in the Nepal

Weekly Magazine in 2015, nearly 40 percent of retired combatants used their financial packages to migrate for work, mainly to India, Gulf countries, and parts of East Asia. For those who had been injured or permanently disabled during the conflict, however, migration was often not possible. These individuals frequently had to spend their settlement money on medical treatment, rehabilitation, or basic living expenses. Some returned to live with their families in rural areas, while others maintained connections with the Maoist party, occasionally participating in political activities or community mobilization.

The lack of sustained reintegration programs created additional complications. Without stable employment or social support, a small number of former combatants drifted toward criminal networks, local gangs, or minor armed factions. While such cases were not representative of the majority, they illustrate how gaps in post-conflict support systems can create long-term risks for both individuals and communities. Former fighters who had suffered injuries during the war continued to hope that the government would provide pensions, healthcare services, or other forms of assistance. Yet many reported ongoing difficulties in securing reliable livelihoods or achieving full acceptance within their communities. Female ex-combatants often described even greater challenges, as they faced the dual pressures of reintegration and the expectations associated with traditional gender roles.

It is important to remember that before joining the insurgency, many of these individuals had led relatively ordinary and carefree lives. Most were students or young villagers who depended on their families and had not yet developed clear long-term goals. The Maoist movement changed that trajectory dramatically. Life within the insurgency offered structure, discipline, and a powerful sense of purpose. Combatants received training, learned to handle weapons, traveled across different regions to fulfill organizational duties, and developed strong bonds of solidarity with fellow fighters. For many, the cantonments later became spaces of shared identity and collective belonging. Some combatants even married during this period, beginning family lives while still holding on to the hope that their struggle would eventually lead to a more just society.

Looking back today, many former combatants describe their post-conflict experiences with a mixture of nostalgia and disappointment. The sense of pride, unity, and empowerment they once felt during the movement contrasts sharply with the uncertainties of their present circumstances. The promises of rapid social

transformation and personal advancement that inspired them during the insurgency have not always materialized in the ways they had imagined.

Ultimately, the stories of these individuals highlight the complex realities of post-conflict recovery. Financial compensation alone cannot address the deeper challenges associated with reintegration, including psychological adjustment, social reconciliation, and economic stability. The lived experiences and personal narratives of former combatants reveal not only the struggles they continue to face but also the broader difficulties involved in rebuilding trust, restoring community relationships, and creating meaningful opportunities for those emerging from years of armed conflict.

## 6. Challenges after Reintegration

At this particular stage in their post-conflict trajectories, former Maoist combatants found themselves confronting a complex mix of economic hardship, social adjustment, and psychological strain that deeply influenced how successfully they could return to ordinary civilian life. For many of them, the transition was far from smooth. A considerable number struggled to secure stable employment or meaningful work, largely because years spent within the armed movement had left them without vocational training or marketable skills that could easily translate into the civilian economy. Opportunities for reliable income were scarce, and the absence of sustainable livelihoods often produced deep frustration and uncertainty about the future. Many ex-combatants had once imagined that their participation in the struggle would help build a more just and egalitarian society, and when that expectation did not materialize in their own lives, disappointment and resentment quietly emerged. These challenges were particularly severe for women, who already faced entrenched structural disadvantages within Nepali society. Historically, women in Nepal have encountered multiple layers of exclusion, often being denied equal access to education, healthcare, property ownership, legal protection, and meaningful participation in political and economic decision-making.

For numerous young women, the Maoist insurgency initially appeared to offer an unexpected pathway toward challenging such long-standing inequalities. The movement projected itself not only as a revolutionary political campaign but also as a transformative social platform through which marginalized groups, especially women, could contest the rigid hierarchies embedded in everyday life. Within the organizational structure of the insurgency, women were able to

work alongside male comrades in roles that were relatively comparable in responsibility and recognition. Many experienced, perhaps for the first time, an environment where their intellectual contributions, courage, and physical endurance were acknowledged rather than dismissed. Participation in the armed struggle therefore came to symbolize much more than military involvement. For many women it represented a rare opportunity to assert dignity, independence, and personal agency in social spheres from which they had long been excluded by tradition and custom.

The effects of the insurgency were even more significant for women belonging to historically marginalized caste communities. These women had endured generations of economic deprivation, social humiliation, political marginalization, and, in some cases, exploitation and abuse. Against this background, joining the Maoist movement offered a way to convert personal grievances into collective resistance. Through participation in the armed struggle, they found a channel through which they could articulate their dissatisfaction with both the existing state apparatus and the deeply rooted social hierarchies that shaped daily life. Many former female combatants have recalled that the ideological orientation of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), particularly its strong emphasis on gender equality, social justice, and women's empowerment, served as a powerful motivating force in their decision to join the movement. In their view, the insurgency represented a vehicle through which entrenched socio-cultural discrimination could be challenged and broader rights for women could be demanded across the country.

Throughout the years of conflict, women combatants carried out a wide array of responsibilities that extended far beyond traditional expectations of gender roles. Their contributions included organizing logistical support, mobilizing communities politically, gathering intelligence, and participating in a variety of operational tasks. These experiences often produced profound personal transformations. Many women reported gaining confidence in leadership roles, developing the ability to make strategic decisions, and strengthening their sense of self-worth. Some described their involvement in the movement as a deeply empowering period of their lives, noting that the struggle had reshaped how they understood their own capabilities and potential. The insurgency also triggered broader social shifts within the movement's internal culture. For instance, marriages that crossed caste and ethnic boundaries became increasingly common among Maoist cadres, including female fighters. Such relationships were often

interpreted as deliberate attempts to challenge rigid social norms and embody ideals of equality and social transformation. In this way, the insurgency influenced not only political mobilization but also the evolving visibility and social roles of women within Nepal's wider socio-political landscape.

Verification carried out by the United Nations Mission in Nepal documented 3,846 female combatants within the Maoist ranks, representing roughly one-fifth of the total fighting force. Despite this substantial presence, only around one hundred women were eventually integrated into the Nepal Army during the formal peace process. Life inside the cantonments also brought significant personal changes. Many female cadres married and began raising families, gradually assuming primary responsibility for childcare and household management (Saferworld, 2010). In numerous households, husbands chose to pursue integration into the national army while their wives remained outside the process in order to manage family responsibilities. Recruitment criteria for integration created additional obstacles for women. Mothers with young children, especially those who were pregnant or breastfeeding, were commonly considered ineligible. Some women also had spouses who had been injured during the conflict and required ongoing care, which further limited their ability to pursue military careers. Others became discouraged after observing fellow female combatants being labeled "under-qualified", even when they felt capable of meeting the required standards. A number of women temporarily left cantonments to give birth and, as a result, missed the crucial re-verification stage necessary for integration. Decision-making within families also shaped outcomes. When a husband opted for integration, it was common for the wife to select voluntary retirement instead, a pattern that further reduced women's participation in the integration process.

In the years following the end of the conflict, many female former combatants reported experiencing renewed feelings of marginalization and vulnerability. Instead of the empowerment they had once felt within the movement, everyday civilian life often brought isolation and uncertainty. A large number now reside in communities where they lack supportive social networks, leaving them with limited opportunities for collective solidarity. Their experiences are frequently complicated by stigma related both to inter-caste marriages and to their past involvement in the Maoist army. These social attitudes make it difficult for them to achieve full acceptance within local communities. In response to such challenges, former female fighters established the

Former PLA Women Foundation, an organization that now represents approximately three thousand members. According to participants within this network, the most pressing issues they currently face are the scarcity of stable livelihood opportunities and the continuing struggle for meaningful social reintegration. Some women attempted to invest their voluntary retirement funds in small businesses such as poultry farms, livestock raising, or neighborhood grocery shops. Yet many lacked the practical business experience, training, and market awareness required to sustain these ventures. Consequently, several of these efforts collapsed, leaving the women burdened with debt and financial losses.

Unlike many of their male counterparts, who frequently migrated abroad in search of employment, most female ex-combatants remained in Nepal. One important factor shaping this decision was a government policy that prohibited Nepali women under the age of thirty from migrating to Gulf countries for labour work. The regulation was introduced primarily as a protective measure, intended to reduce risks of exploitation, abuse, and trafficking that had been widely reported among migrant workers. Although a few women managed to travel abroad through irregular or informal channels, the majority chose to remain in Nepal because they were aware of the dangers associated with overseas employment, including physical harm and sexual exploitation.

Today, many former female combatants live in urban or semi-urban areas scattered across the country. Interestingly, a large number intentionally conceal their past identity as members of the Maoist army. They understand that revealing this background can provoke suspicion, misunderstanding, or judgment from neighbors who may not appreciate the complexities of their wartime experiences. As a result, they often carry what might be described as a form of "double stigma". On one side, they are judged for their association with an armed political movement; on the other, they are criticized for having stepped outside traditional gender expectations by participating in combat. Women's perspectives were also largely absent from the formal peace negotiations that followed the conflict. For example, no women were included in the Special Committee or Technical Committee responsible for overseeing the integration and rehabilitation process. Consequently, the particular concerns of female ex-combatants received little attention in official policy frameworks. Over time, however, political discourse in Nepal has gradually begun to incorporate issues of women's rights and gender equality, reflecting

a growing, though still incomplete, recognition of women's contributions to political and social change.

Overall, the well-being of former Maoist combatants remains uncertain and fragile. Many continue to report low levels of subjective well-being, marked by emotional stress, limited personal satisfaction, and a diminished sense of life quality. Persistent stigma, rejection by communities, and inadequate reintegration support have eroded their feelings of dignity and belonging. These conditions often prevent them from feeling fully accepted within mainstream society. At the same time, insufficient access to training and skill-development programs has restricted their chances of securing stable employment. Consequently, many ex-combatants face narrow economic prospects and limited opportunities for upward mobility. Female ex-combatants experience particularly complex challenges because their difficulties arise from the intersection of gender inequality and their identity as former fighters. This intersection constrains their participation in economic, social, and political life and restricts their capacity to exercise personal agency.

In summary, the post-conflict realities faced by Maoist ex-combatants reflect a complicated blend of material hardship and deeply embedded social barriers. Economic limitations-including unstable income, lack of professional skills, and fragile livelihoods-interact with subjective experiences such as stigma, weakened identity, and feelings of exclusion. Together, these conditions restrict the genuine freedoms and opportunities available to many former fighters and limit their ability to pursue lives they themselves consider meaningful. Although advocacy initiatives and political commitments to their rights have emerged over time, the needs of many former combatants remain only partially addressed. This continuing gap highlights persistent weaknesses in post-conflict rehabilitation strategies, gender-sensitive reintegration programs, and broader societal acceptance within Nepal's ongoing journey toward peace-building and social transformation.

## 7. Conclusion

The experiences of Maoist ex-combatants in post-conflict Nepal demonstrate that the formal end of armed conflict does not automatically ensure successful social and economic reintegration. Many former fighters returned to civilian life without adequate vocational skills, stable employment opportunities, or sufficient community support. As a result, they continue to face financial insecurity, social exclusion, and uncertainty about their future. These

conditions have affected their sense of dignity, belonging, and social acceptance. In several cases, ex-combatants conceal their past involvement in the conflict due to stigma, while others continue to expect that the promises of social security and equitable opportunities associated with the peace process will eventually be realized. Women ex-combatants experience particularly acute challenges, often confronting a "double stigma" linked both to their past participation in armed struggle and to prevailing gender norms that limit women's roles in society.

The findings can be better understood through the capability approach proposed by Amartya Sen, which conceptualizes well-being not merely in terms of income or material resources but in terms of the real freedoms individuals possess to pursue valued ways of living. In the case of Maoist ex-combatants, many of these capabilities—including access to meaningful employment, education, and full social participation—remain constrained. Consequently, their ability to achieve genuine well-being remains limited despite the formal conclusion of the conflict. These findings also suggest that sustainable peace requires more than the cessation of violence; it also requires inclusive reintegration policies, expanded livelihood opportunities, and social environments that restore dignity and recognition. Strengthening these conditions is essential if former combatants are to move beyond survival and attain the substantive freedoms necessary for a meaningful and stable post-conflict life.

Future research should also further explore the long-term socio-economic trajectories of ex-combatants and critically assess the effectiveness of reintegration policies in promoting inclusive post-conflict development. Longitudinal studies could provide deeper insights into how former combatants' livelihoods, social identities, and psychological well-being evolve over time, particularly in relation to access to education, employment opportunities, and community acceptance. Such research should also pay closer attention to gendered experiences of reintegration, the role of local institutions and community networks, and the regional variations that shape post-conflict recovery. In addition, examining reintegration outcomes through frameworks such as the capability approach developed by Amartya Sen may offer valuable perspectives on how policies influence individuals' real opportunities to achieve meaningful and dignified lives. Generating this evidence will not only deepen scholarly understanding of post-conflict transitions but also help policymakers design more effective and inclusive strategies for sustainable peace-building in Nepal.

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